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￿ During the Great Recession, central banks went well beyond their normal operations
and provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign currency and to foreign banks.
Central bank cooperation took the form of a swap network, and amounted to an epi-
sode of global monetary policy.
￿ However, though bank cooperation will continue to contribute to global governance,
the swap network should not be made permanent and given an institutional basis to
provide international lending of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool and
should continue to be decided on by central banks like all other monetary policy tools,
to avoid impinging on their independence, which a difficult historical process has
shown to be the best basis for price stability. 
￿ In comments appended to this Policy Contribution, Edwin Truman, Senior Fellow,
Peterson Institute for International Economics, concludes in favour of making the
swap network permanent, while William Dudley, President of the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York,stresses the importance of central banks around the world being
able to coordinate closely so that there can be a viable, credible backstop on a global
basis.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Central banks normally provide liquidity:
1. In carefully controlled quantities and
2. Only in national currency to national banks.
During the Great Recession however central banks
provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, also in
foreign currency and to foreign banks. While
central banks could provide on their own unlimited
liquidity in national currency to national banks,
the provision of liquidity in foreign currency or to
foreign banks could take place only through
cooperation with other central banks. The form this
cooperation took was a swap network, through
which central banks committed to lend to each
other large, in some cases unlimited, amounts of
their currency, which other central banks could
lend on to their own banks. Thus monetary policy
became potentially more complete for both the
lending and the borrowing central bank: foreign
counterparties could be reached by the former,
foreign currencies could be provided by the latter.
The swaps were the foreign component of an
overall response to the crisis. The Great Recession
had a global character and, through the swap
network, central bank cooperation rose to the
same level, to the point of being an episode of
global monetary policy.
This exceptional development can only be
understood taking into account both the extreme
gravity of the crisis and the long history of central
bank collaboration, which allowed them to unite
to avoid a repeat of the Great Depression. 
In examining central bank cooperation during the
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‘During the Great Recession central banks provided liquidity in unlimited amounts, in foreign
currency and to foreign banks. Through the swap network, central bank cooperation increased
to the point of being an episode of global monetary policy.’
Great Recession, I notice that while the actions of
central banks in advanced economies had much
in common, the ECB took a more guarded attitude
than the Federal Reserve to the extension of the
swaps. This Policy Contribution attempts to
identify the reasons for this difference.
I also advance the thesis that central bank
cooperation contributes to global economic
governance, a substantially under-produced
international public good (Kindleberger, 1986).
However, I also conclude that the swap network
should not be made permanent and be given an
institutional basis to provide international lending
of last resort. Swaps are a monetary policy tool
and should continue to be decided on by central
banks like all other monetary policy tools, to avoid
impinging on the independence of central banks,
which a difficult historical process has shown to
be the best basis for price stability. 
I also flag up the risk that the forcefulness of
centra l banks in reacting to the crisis could
engender the illusion, similar to what happened
when the gold standard was abandoned, that
monetary policy is some kind of panacea.
Two clear borders limit this paper. First, it will not
deal with the central bank cooperation that led to
European monetary union. Second, it does not
address regulatory aspects, which have already
been covered (Angeloni 2008). 
Section 2 illustrates central bank cooperation
during the Great Recession. Section 3 assesses
the link between the international lender of last
resort function and the swap network.
Conclusions are drawn in section 4.03
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1. With the limited excep-
tion of the swaps estab-
lished after the 11
September 2001 attacks in
the United States.
2 CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION DURING THE
GREAT RECESSION
The swap network
The most visible aspect of central bank
cooperation during the Great Recession was the
establishment of a swap network in which one
central bank granted funding in its currency to
another central bank, to allow it to provide liquidity
in that currency to banks located in its jurisdiction.
Table 1 shows the size and scope of the swaps
granted by the Fed, which were by far the most
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Figure 1: Fed swap amounts outstanding, by foreign central bank
Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (daily data), updated from Goldberg et al(2010). Note: Figure 1 ends
in October 2010. The swap arrangements of the Fed with the Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the ECB, and the Swiss National
Bank are still in place through March, 2014, but the amounts drawn in the recent period are too small to be represented.
Table 1: Swaps agreed by the Federal Reserve of the United States to other central banks
Central bank
counterparty
Line size
(US$ bns)
Total amount
extended
(US$ bns)*
Average
interest rate
(%)
Foreign
currency
Average
exchange
rate
Total foreign
currency
amount
received (bns)
Number of
transactions
ECB Unlimited  8,011.00  1.54 Euro 1.35 5,942.00  271
Bank of England Unlimited 918.00  1.78 British pound 1.65 540,.00  81
Swiss National
Bank
Unlimited 465.00  1.49 Swiss franc 1.13 521.00  114
Bank of Japan Unlimited 387.00  1.41 Japanese yen 94.56 37,494.00  35
Danmarks
Nationalbank
15 72.00 1.25 Danish krone 5.58 409.00  18
Sveriges
Riksbank
30 67.00  1.09
Swedish
krona 7.93 535.00  10
Reserve Bank of
Australia
30 53.00  1.56 Australian
dollar
0.68 77.00  10
Bank of Korea 30 41.00  1.72 South Korean
won
1333 56,852.00  19
Norges Bank 15 29.00  1.37
Norwegian
krone 6.64 198.00  8
Banco de Mexico 30 10.00  0.73 Mexican peso 13.28 128.00  3
Bank of Canada 30 N/A N/A
Canadian
dollar N/A N/A N/A
Source: Bruegel based on Goldberg et al(2010). Note: * The ‘Total amount extended’ is the accumulated funds drawn from
the Fed by a foreign central bank between 17 December 2007 and 13 July 2010.
important. In particular the Fed decided that the
European Central Bank, the Swiss National Bank,
the Bank of England and the Bank of Japan could
draw an unlimited amount of dollars from the
swaps, up to a three month maturity. Another 10
central banks could draw sizeable amounts.
However, it was not only the size and scope of the
swaps that were exceptional. It was also nearly
unprecedented1 that the swaps took place in
liquidity management and not in the traditional
domain of exchange rate management. 
At the peak of the crisis the swaps surpassed the half
trillion dollars level, with most being taken by the ECB.The swaps granted by the Fed were the most
prominent, but, as Figure 2 shows, other central
banks also established swaps, thus making the
network genuinely global. In addition, the swaps
between the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the
Bank of England, the Bank of Canada and the
Swiss National Bank were reciprocal, with each
central bank making its currency potentially
available to the other central banks2.
The main reason for the swaps granted by the Fed
was the unprecedented illiquidity in the foreign
exchange swap market, combined with the
substantial gap between lending and stable
liabilities of non-US banks, in particular European
ones, in dollars3. Until the failure of Lehman
Brothers, non-US banks could fill much of this gap
by exchanging their national currencies in the
swap market against dollars. The price they paid
for borrowing indirectly through the foreign
exchange swap market was very close to what
they paid when borrowing directly on the Libor
market. Indeed, covered interest parity, whereby
the interest rate differential between two
currencies is equal to the forward discount or
premium of one currency against the other, has
been one of the more robust empirical regularities
in international finance. With the crisis, the foreign
exchange swap market dried up and borrowing
dollars via that route became much more difficult.
Figure 3 shows that the cost differential between
the direct and the indirect borrowing of dollars
moved from around zero to a peak of a few
hundred basis points for the euro and the pound
2. These mutual swap
arrangements are not
reflected in the figure, but
there should be arrows
between the relevant cen-
tral banks as well. These
swap lines were authorised
as a contingency measure.
To date, there has been no
drawing on them.
3. According to McGuire and
von Peter (2009): “A lower-
bound estimate of banks’
funding gap, measured as
the net amount of US dollars
channelled to non-banks,
shows that the major Euro-
pean banks’ funding needs
were substantial ($1.1–1.3
trillion by mid-2007).”They
added that: “Until the onset
of the crisis, European
banks had met this need by
tapping the interbank
market ($400 billion) and
by borrowing from central
banks ($380 billion), and
used FX swaps ($800 bil-
lion) to convert (primarily)
domestic currency funding
into dollars.”
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Figure 3: Euro and sterling, covered interest rate diﬀerential against the US$
Source: Datastream and Bruegel.
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Figure 2: Foreign currency-swap arrangements between central banks
Source: Bruegel reproduced from Allen and Moessner (2010).sterling. The issue was not merely one of cost. For
some European banks, the foreign exchange swap
market was closed, whatever price they would
have been willing to pay. Obtaining dollars on the
spot market, which remained liquid, was not a
practical alternative, as it would have created,
given the size of the gap to be filled, unsustainable
exchange risk for commercial banks and
destabilising appreciation pressure on the dollar.
The swap network: an interpretation
While lending among central banks has a long
history, the swap network established in 2007
nevertheless represented a quantum leap in
central bank cooperation4.
The unprecedented nature of the swaps also
derived from the fact that they were mostly the
international extension of domestic ‘non-standard’
monetary policy measures5. Indeed the swaps
granted by the Fed extended the Term Auction
Facility (TAF)6beyond the borders of the US (Baba
and Packer, 2009). Essentially, during the crisis
the Fed, the ECB, the Bank of Japan, the Bank of
England and the Swiss National Bank did
something that is normally anathema: giving up
control over their balance sheets, because of both
domestic liquidity measures and the swaps. For
those with a monetarist inclination, believing there
is a constant or easy-to-forecast money multiplier
and a stable money demand function, this heresy
can be brought into sharper relief by noting that
central banks no longer controlled the growth of
the monetary base. Of course, the swaps were
priced so that they would not attract banks in
normal circumstances, and thus would have an
effect on central bank balance sheets only in
crisis conditions. Still, given the crisis, the pricing
was convenient for banks, which indeed drew very
large amounts of liquidity from central banks.
As mentioned, the swaps were the international
dimension of non-standard monetary policy. They
extended the counterparties that the issuing
central bank could access: in a way, the ECB acted
as the thirteenth District Bank of the Fed7. In
addition, the swaps allowed a central bank to
issue central bank liquidity in a currency other
than its own. So monetary policy became
potentially more complete for both lending and
borrowing central banks (foreign counterparties
for one, foreign currencies for the other). The Great
Recession had a global character and central bank
action rose to the same level in order to provide an
effective response to it.
The swap lines can be understood within an
overall interpretation of the action of central banks
during the Great Recession: they complemented
the impaired intermediation of the market by
bringing part of it onto their books, to avoid even
more extended damage to the economy8. This
implied moving from the provision of the net
amount of liquidity necessary to keep interest
rates at the desired level to carrying out proper
financial intermediation. This implied, in turn,
moving into areas normally outside the sphere of
central banks. This explains why the ECB extended
its operations from a maximum of three months to
three years and broadened it to other currencies.
The extended intermediation of central banks was
made possible by the fact that there were no
inflationary risks from the loss of control of the
balance sheet. In particular, the textbook chain of
causation from base money to wider money
aggregates, through the money multiplier, and
then to inflation, through the money demand
function, was totally broken during the crisis9. Had
there been inflationary risks, central banks would
have not been able to pursue such ‘non-standard’
measures, to remain faithful to their mandates.
While the swap lines did not bring inflationary risk,
they inevitably created some moral hazard. Banks
were in a vulnerable situation because they were
filling the structural gap between assets and
liabilities in foreign currency with short-term
funding. When this vulnerability transformed itself
into a fully-fledged crisis, central banks softened
the crisis’ impact by providing the foreign currency
funding that markets were no longer providing.
Thus banks suffered only partially the
consequences of their decisions. Central banks
had to accept a degree of moral hazard in order to
avoid major damage to the economy, but they
priced the swaps in a way that this negative
outcome was attenuated. In fact, the interest rate
on the swaps was lower than the foreign exchange
swap market indicated, but higher than what
would have prevailed in normal circumstances10.
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4. Caruana (2012) gave an
historical slant to the
assessment observing that,
“the extension of such
swaps in unlimited
amounts represents a turn
in central bank cooperation
that the founders of the BIS
would have found
unimaginable.”A similar
point was made by Niall
Ferguson at a seminar
sponsored by the Bank of
Japan and the International
Monetary Fund in Tokyo on
14 October 2012.
5. This is the approach
chosen by Lenza et al
(2010) to analyse the
effects of non-standard
measures.
6. Under the TAF, the Federal
Reserve auctioned term
funds to banks. 
7. Allen and Moessner
(2010) note that: “..., swap
arrangements were used
during the credit crisis as a
means of providing
currency-specific liquidity
to banks outside the home
territory of the currency
concerned, thus, in effect,
widening the geographical
reach of national open-
market operations.”
8. As argued in Papadia and
Välimäki (2011).
9. See the Bruegel blog by
Francesco Papadia and
Giuseppe Daluiso, of 25
March 2013.
10. Specifically the banks
had to pay initially 100 and
then 50 basis points over
the relevant Overnight
Index Swap rate.Thus, albeit to a limited extent, banks were
penalised for having put themselves in a
dangerous situation.
The size of the Fed’s balance sheet in proportion
to GDP reached, during the Great Recession, the
same level as in the 1940s, when there was
absolute fiscal dominance, and this hints that
central banks also paid a price in terms of getting
closer to a fiscal function. The price, again, had to
be paid, or the economy would have suffered even
more.
These observations apply to all central banks in
advanced economies. However, one can detect a
difference between the Fed and the ECB on the
extension of the swaps. Of course, the clearly
central position of the Fed in the swap network
(Figure 2) reflects the fact that the dollar was the
currency most used by banks in foreign currency
business. One may, however, ask whether the
swaps agreed by the ECB were commensurate
with the role of the euro as second most important
international currency11. Two indicators shed light
on this question.
The first is the stock of central bank reserves
denominated in euro ($1.4 trillion at the end of
2011 (ECB, 2012)) as a proportion (40 percent)
of the amount denominated in dollars ($3.5
trillion)12, and to compare this proportion to the
swaps granted by the ECB relative to the swaps
granted by the Fed. This comparison indicates that
the ECB’s swaps (excluding the never-used
reciprocal lines extended to the Fed, the Bank of
England, the Swiss National Bank and the Bank of
Japan) were tiny relative to the Fed’s. The ECB’s
swaps are measured in billions instead of the
Fed’s hundreds of billions, and were far from the
40 percent represented by global euro reserves
relative to dollar reserves.
The second benchmark, which leads to a similar
conclusion, is the share of the two currencies in
foreign exchange turnover: in 2010, the share of
the euro, 39 percent, was a bit lower than a half of
that of the dollar, around 85 percent. In
conclusion, the swaps extended by the ECB were
small in relation to those of the Fed, even taking
into account the different importance of the two
currencies in global financial markets. Thus, while
other factors should be considered, the
conclusion that the ECB had a more reserved
attitude than the Fed in extending the swaps is
confirmed. ECB reticence was likely based on
greater concerns about moral hazard and a more
conservative approach towards the expansion of
its balance sheet.
Another factor, of more political nature, might have
influenced the ECB: the absence of a government,
which could give backing to the central bank when
embarking on exceptional operations, bordering
on foreign policy. This is a specific aspect of a
broader, and controversial, issue: what are the
consequences of the fact that the ECB, a fully-
fledged federal institution, does not have as a
counterparty a fully-fledged federal executive? Is
this positive, because it enhances central bank
independence, or is it a weakness, because a
strong and independent central bank needs a
strong government partner? The former view
transforms the principle of central bank
independence into one of separation, according
to which the central bank works better the weaker
the institutional setting in which it operates. This
view also assumes that monetary issues can be
fully separated from political considerations. The
weakness of this view can be seen directly in the
case of the swaps: it was politically much easier
for the Fed to grant a swap line to Brazil and Mexico
than, for example, to Argentina and Venezuela,
because the general relationship with the former
two countries was better than with the latter.
Correspondingly, it would have been easier for the
ECB to deal with the difficult case of Hungary,
which had an attitude of defiance towards the
European Union, if it would have had a fully-
fledged European Treasury to talk to. My view is
that checks and balances should also apply to
central banks and that the ECB could have been
more forthcoming if it could have relied on a strong
Treasury partner.
An episode of global monetary policy?
Overall, the size and the scope of the swap
network support the view that it can be seen as an
episode of global monetary policy. The joint
reduction of interest rates by 50 basis points
decided on by six central banks, including the Fed,
the ECB, the Bank of Japan and the Bank of
11. The ECB does not pub-
lish data on the size of the
swap lines. However, all
available information indi-
cates that they were of the
order of a few billion euro.
12. Only the amount of
reserves whose composi-
tion is disclosed can be
considered.
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13. The interpretation that
monetary policy took a
global dimension at the
peak of the crisis is consis-
tent with the assessment of
Vice Chairman of the Fed-
eral Reserve D. Kohn, as
reported by Allen and
Moessner (2010, Page 9)
and by Friedman and Kut-
tner (2011).
14. The 2009 IMF Global
Financial Stability Report
and Allen and Moessner
(2010) reach similar con-
clusions.
15. Sachs (1995), Fischer
(1999), Giannini (1999),
Borio and Toniolo (2008),
Obstfeld (2009), Allen and
Moessner (2010), Pickford
(2011) and Truman (2011),
Kindleberger and Aliber
(2011).
16. Buiter and Rahbari
(2012) argue that the risk
of switches from good to
bad equilibrium is a serious
one for a sovereign given
the illiquidity of most of its
assets and the maturity
transformation that charac-
terises its balance sheet.
17. Some have expressed
themselves in favour (Pick-
ford 2011) or against (Allen
and Moessner 2010) this
change. Truman (in his
2011 paper) and in the
comment attached to this
paper builds on the experi-
ence of the Bretton Woods
swaps and elaborates on a
structure in which the
swaps would be activated
by the converging will of the
relevant central banks and,
possibly, the IMF. Fischer
(1999), Obstfeld (2009),
Sachs (1995) supported
the attribution of the func-
tion of international lender
of last resort to the IMF.
‘While the need for an international lender of last resort has been demonstrated, whether the
swap network between central banks should be made permanent, receive an institutional basis
and fulfil the function of international lender of last resort is more controversial.’
England, to react to the acute dislocation following
the demise of Lehman Brothers, matched on the
price side, albeit on a more exceptional basis, the
more long lasting cooperation on the quantitative
side13.
Of course, the global monetary measures taken
during the Great Recession were possible only in
the special circumstances that prevailed at that
time: economic and financial conditions were so
acutely difficult that they acquired a global
character and required a global response,
trumping any national consideration. In normal
circumstances, central bank cooperation will not
need to rise again to the level of a common policy
response. Cooperation will, however, remain
essential since crises are generated by a
sequence of choices, including monetary ones,
during seemingly tranquil times.
The final history of the action of central banks
during the Great Recession still has to be written –
bearing in mind that discussions are still
continuing about the responsibilities of the Fed
during the Great Depression, more than 80 year
ago. Still, the evidence collected so far is clearly
that joint action during the Great Recession helped
at least to shorten the crisis or relieve its effects
(Klyuev et al2009).
On the swap lines, the prudent conclusions of
Goldberg et al(2010) are an effective summary14:
“We conclude that the CB dollar swap facilities are
an important part of a toolbox for dealing with
systemic liquidity disruptions.” (Goldberg et al,
page 1). In particular they report from the
analyses of McAndrews et al(2008): “Noteworthy
for our discussion of the central bank swap
facilities is that, McAndrews, Sarkar and Wang
distinguish between domestic TAF and
international (swap facility) announcements in
econometric exercises. The announcements
along the international dimension of the liquidity
facilities were the dominant drivers of the overall
announcement effects, both quantitatively and in
terms of statistical significance.”
3 THE SWAP NETWORK AND THE ISSUE OF THE
GLOBAL LENDER OF LAST RESORT
Inevitably, the establishment of the swaps rekindled
the discussion about the need for an international
lender of last resort, a discussion with a long history15.
The two basic reasons establishing the need for
an international lender of last resort are the same
as in a domestic setting: first, the possibility of
alternating ‘good’ and ‘bad’ equilibria, with sudden
moves from over-abundant to scarce liquidity16;
second, the collective action problem, whereby a
multitude of independent agents cannot coordi-
nate to do something (eg not withdrawing bank
deposits before everybody else) that would be
beneficial for both the lenders and the borrowers.
Empirically, the unending series of crises narrated
by Kindleberger and Aliber (2011) and measured
by Reinhart and Rogoff (2008) proves that crises
are as much a characteristic of the international
as of the domestic landscape. 
While the need for an international lender of last
resort has been well demonstrated, the answer to
the question of whether the swap network
between central banks should be made perma-
nent, receive an institutional basis and fulfil the
function of international lender of last resort is
more controversial17.
There are three arguments in favour of transform-
ing the swap network into an institutional set-up,
taking on the function of international lender of
last resort:
1 Central banks create liquidity at will, therefore
their action can be very powerful;
2 The swap network exists, is very large, func-
tioned effectively and it is therefore natural to
build on it;
3 If central banks assured protection against liq-
uidity shocks through a permanent, large, and
automatic swap network, the need for self-
assurance by means of very large international
reserves would be obviated.08
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There are four arguments against this solution:
1 The swaps were extraordinary measures, taken
in very special circumstances but within the
mandate of central banks as components of
overall monetary policy, if they were
institutionalised they would, directly or
indirectly, not be decided in full independence
by the relevant central banks;
2 Central banks are not in a good position to take
the measures needed to attenuate the moral
hazard problems that a lender of last resort
function inevitably implies;
3 In analogy with what happens at domestic level,
international lending of last resort requires
(Sachs, 1995; Giannini, 1999), something akin
to bankruptcy procedures, which are alien to the
responsibilities of central banks and difficult to
establish in an international setting;
4 Central banks managed to create the swap
network very expeditiously during the Great
Recession, thus no special, pre-established
setup is necessary.
The first argument against institutionalising the
swap network is clearly the most important, so
much that the overall conclusion depends on its
validity. This validity depends, in turn, on the
position one takes on central bank independence. 
I have already discussed the issue of central bank
independence and, while I believe this should not
mean isolation, it implies full control of interest
rates and the balance sheet. Whether a permanent
and institutionalised swap network would be
inconsistent with such full control may depend on
its fine print. Indeed there is a continuum of
arrangements between the present system, in
which central banks independently decide to
enter into swap agreements, and one in which
other bodies – governments or the IMF – could
decide on swap agreements. An intermediate set-
up is the one developed by Truman (2011). The
preferable approach is to maintain the present sit-
uation and treat swaps as any other monetary
policy instrument. A special decision-making pro-
cedure, within an institutionalised setup, could
lead to central banks being pressured to extend
swaps. This could weaken the ‘monetary technol-
ogy’ that over the decades has given the best
results in managing a fiat currency: an independ-
ent central bank devoted to price s tability.
In conclusion, the disadvantages of attributing to
a permanent and institutionalised central bank
swaps network the function of international lender
of last resort are greater than the advantages. This
does not at all imply that the swaps, which
assured lending of last resort during the Great
Recession, were a mistake. They were, as argued
above, a significant component of the overall
action that helped avoid a repeat of the Great
Depression. Neither does this conclusion exclude
that central banks will continue, as they have
done for centuries, to lend money to each other,
also in a lender of last resort mode. Finally, it does
not mean that the International Monetary Fund
could not contribute to the task of providing an
international lender of last resort. But the decision
to grant swap lines to other central banks, and
more generally to lend them money, also when
this can be configured as lending of last resort,
must continue to be taken independently by cen-
tral banks, in accordance with their overall mone-
tary policy remits. In other words central banks
must be fully responsible for controlling their bal-
ance sheets also when, in exceptional circum-
stances, they decide to cede control of them.
One may question the validity of this conclusion in
a European Union proceeding to a banking union.
Should the ECB make swaps available to central
banks of non-euro area EU members that
participate in the banking union? The argument
above on the need to preserve the ability of the
central bank to control its balance sheet applies
here as well: banking union cannot rely on ECB
funding, which must be decided in view of its
primary objective of price stability. 
If anything, the importance of central bank
independence should be reiterated because the
recourse to non-standard measures, including the
swaps network, may lead to requests for similar
interventions when this would not be justified by
threats to the economy. More generally, public
opinion and governments have seen central
banks doing things nobody thought they could do.
It is ironic, but the more central banks are
successful in containing the crisis, the graver is
the risk that they are overburdened with tasks.
This is, on a smaller scale, analogous to what
happened with the abandonment of the gold
standard: nobody (or nearly nobody) thought this09
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was possible and when it happened it was a sort of
epiphany, creating the illusion that monetary
policy could achieve nearly any macroeconomic
goal. It took several decades, much inflation and
the invention of independent central banks
devoted to price stability, for that illusion to be
quashed. The link to gold, which was inefficient
and only insured price stability over the very long
run, was substituted by a link to the general price
level, moving, so to say, from a gold to a consumer
price index standard. Consistently, once central
banks were subjugated to the permanent
responsibility to pursue price stability, additional
instructions were regarded as either redundant,
when confirming the price stability objective, or
contradictory, if they were not.
In a way, stressing the limits of monetary policy
is restating the obvious: monetary policy is a
powerful tool to steer the economy and to counter
its intrinsic instability. It is not, however, an
omnipotent tool and its over-use can have serious
consequences. One can indeed go a step further:
the more parsimonious a central bank is in normal
times in achieving its objectives, the more can it
be bold during crises without engendering
inflationary risks.
4 CONCLUSIONS
Central bank cooperation will continue to be an
important component of global governance.
History shows that central banks have long
cooperated and can quickly act when they see the
need to do it. This is what they did during the Great
Recession, when they cooperated in the taking of
‘non-standard measures’, including the granting
of swap lines. Cooperation was so intense during
the most acute phases of the crisis that it was, in
effect, a case of global monetary policy action.
International lending of last resort squarely falls
within central banks’ mandate, particularly when
the source of the problem is illiquidity. However,
the preservation of the ‘monetary technology’ that
the most appropriate basis for the management of
a fiat currency is an independent central bank
devoted to the primary objective of price stability,
requires that any action in the area of international
lending of last resort be decided independently,
like any other policy action, by the central banks
involved. This excludes making the central bank
swap network permanent and giving it an
institutional character. Furthermore, there is no
particular reason why international lending of last
resort should be a monopoly of central banks. In
particular, the International Monetary Fund could
also play a role in this area, especially when it is
not obvious that lending of last resort is needed
because of a liquidity crisis deriving from the
appearance of a ‘bad’ equilibrium or of a collective-
action problem.
Overall, the prescription not to overburden
monetary policy holds at international as well as
at domestic level. This prescription is particularly
important after central banks have shown during
the crisis their ability to do things that nobody
thought they were capable of doing: providing
liquidity beyond their borders and in a foreign
currency and expanding, over a short period, their
balance sheets by a factor of three or four.
Demonstrating unexpected abilities should not
feed illusions that central banks can do more than
they actually can.10
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COMMENTS ON ‘CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION
DURING THE GREAT RECESSSION’
EDWIN M. TRUMAN
Senior Fellow
Peterson Institute for International Economics
This Policy Contribution is a thorough review of
central bank cooperation during the great
recession based on the earlier history of such
cooperation. I have no fundamental problem with
the basic framework and agree with many of the
paper’s observations. I will focus my comments
on three principal areas of disagreement.
First, I think history will conclude that the recent
era of central bank insulation/isolation from
governments was an unsuccessful institutional
arrangement. The paper is right that a deal was
made: central bank independence with a narrow
focus on price stability but in exchange the central
bank was otherwise cut off from economic and
financial responsibilities. This was an unrealistic
and ultimately costly bargain for both parties to
the bargain most tellingly in the euro area. The
governments lost partners, the finance ministries
in particular. Finance ministries, in general, share
most of the philosophical orientation and cultural
values of central banks. For their part, the central
banks were in a never-never land of non-
responsibility.
When the crunch came, the governments turned
to the central banks. That was where the money
was and that was where much of the expertise lay.
Central banks had left the theatre, but they were
dragged back onto centre stage. That paradigm is
likely to persist regardless of protests from central
bankers.
The paper makes this point indirectly by noting the
ECB’s lack of a single politically responsible
counterparty, in contrast with the Federal Reserve
and other national central banks outside the euro
area. It is also the case that the Federal Reserve
had a longer history than the ECB and, therefore,
more credibility to draw upon when it adopted
non-standard measures.
Second, on the topic of central banks as
international lenders of last resort, I strongly differ
with the arguments in the paper which to my mind
are naïve and excessively defensive.
To start with, we have had a permanent global
swap network. It was centred on the Federal
Reserve. It was established in 1962 and lasted a
quarter of a century until 1998. That structure’s
permanence did not compromise central bank
independence. The key point about that history is
not just that the structure was in place, but also
that use of it required a request by central bank A
and acceptance of that request by central bank B.
Thus, central bank B retained almost complete
control. To argue that the arrangements put in
place during the Great Recession could easily be
replicated if the need were to arise ignores the fact
that even in central banks there is a tendency to
forget about tools that are never used. The global
swap network was able to be cranked up in 2008
because it had only been wound down in 1998. It
also had been resurrected for potential use at the
time of the millennium change-over, and it was
used in the wake of the 11 September 2001
attack. But substantial inertia had to be overcome
even with this recent history before the structure
could be re-employed in 2008.
My proposals for a global swap network (Truman,
2011) build on that earlier structure via three
keys. Those three keys guarantee that there would
be no automaticity. One key would be held by the
IMF, though that is not necessary; it would declare
a global liquidity need. The second key would be
held by the central banks, which had previously
set up the swap network based on membership
criteria of their own collective design. The central
banks as a group would agree or disagree with the
IMF declaration of a global liquidity need. The third
key would be held by the individual central banks.
Each member of the pair would have to agree to an
activation of a particular line. Of course, nothing in
this approach would rule out ad hoc swap
arrangements.
Moral hazard concerns associated with such a
global swap network could be addressed in many
ways. One approach would be via the criteria for
membership in the network. The analogy would be
to banks that, in some countries, are granted
discretionary access to the discount window and
that access, itself, is linked to supervision of their13
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condition. Moreover, the moral hazard associated
with fire departments is not reduced by pretending
the firehouse does not exist. Central banks should
be prepared to dispense liquidity because doing
so gives confidence to markets. Central banks
should have more confidence in their judgment
than to be afraid of being asked to do so.
Contrary to what is argued in the paper, the IMF
itself is not a viable alternative to a global swap
network among central banks because no coun-
try would want to put, say, $1 trillion openly at the
IMF’s disposal (in 2008-09 the maximum out-
standing was more than $600 billion, and next
time it will be at least double that amount). Emer-
gency liquidity for balance-sheet support requires
the use of leverage. The IMF cannot leverage itself.
Central banks create money and, therefore, can
leverage themselves. As an alternative to my
three-key approach, one could adopt, as I have
also suggested, a more IMF-centric approach in
which central banks have swap lines with the IMF
that could be used by the IMF with the consent of
the central bank (and its government) in a global
financial meltdown to advance funds to govern-
ments and central banks that need to support
their financial institutions.
On the third issue, central banks and control of
their balance sheets in the global financial crisis,
the argument that central banks extraordinarily
gave up control of their balance sheets is
overstated. Central banks decided to open up their
balance sheets. As the paper notes, if conditions
were different, for example with higher inflation,
the central banks might not have done so (indeed,
the ECB used its standard measures to raise its
policy interest rate in the first year of the crisis out
of a (misplaced) concern about inflation). The core
issue is not whether central banks are ‘able’ to
adopt these non-standard measures, but whether
they are ‘willing’ to do so though always in a
manner that is consistent with their mandates.
As far as moral hazard is concerned in this context,
I would note that even standard monetary policy
measures involve an element of moral hazard.
Central banks respond to economic and financial
conditions when they change their policies by
tightening and easing. They build credibility and
anchor expectations through their predictable
reaction functions. In the process, they contribute
to a moral hazard built on expectations about their
actions. And, of course, any use of the discount
window involves opening up the balance sheet of
the central bank, which in principle has the
discretion to offset or not the impact on the
monetary base.
My disagreements aside, I agree with the paper’s
view that we do not have a final verdict on the role
of central banks in the Great Recession. We still
debate this issue with respect to the Great
Depression, when, in fact, many of the powers that
the Federal Reserve used in the Great Recession
were put on the books.
COMMENT ON ‘CENTRAL BANK COOPERATION
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WILLIAM C. DUDLEY
President
Federal Reserve Bank of New York
During the recent crisis, international cooperation
among central banks played an important role.
Not only were there occasional episodes of coor-
dination in monetary policy rate adjustments, but
also a network of foreign exchange swap facilities
was established. These swap arrangements
helped facilitate the ongoing financing of dollar-
based assets around the world during a period of
acute stress and were critical in restoring market
function following the failure of Lehman Brothers
in the fall of 2008. Francesco Papadia’s paper does
an exemplary job defining the key characteristics
of central bank cooperation, with close attention
to the period of the crisis. This is a very important
subject both then and now. Because there is no
well-defined institutional entity empowered to act
as an international lender of last resort to financial
intermediaries, central banks around the world
must be able to coordinate closely so that there
can be a viable, credible backstop on a global
basis. 